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 ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSTITUTIONS: 
SOCIAL AND COMMERCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP ACROSS NATIONS 
 
ABSTRACT 
We model and test the relationship between social and commercial entrepreneurship drawing on 
social capital theory. We propose that the country prevalence rate of social entrepreneurship is an 
indicator of constructible nation-level social capital and enhances the likelihood of individual 
commercial entry. We further posit that both social and commercial entrepreneurial entry is 
facilitated by certain formal institutions, namely strong property rights and (low) government 
activism, albeit the latter impacts each of these types of entrepreneurship differently. We apply 
bivariate discrete choice multi-level modelling to population-representative samples in 47 
countries and find support for these hypotheses. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The value of commercial entrepreneurship for wealth creation is established at the 
forefront of business research. Recently, socially motivated forms of entrepreneurship, that is 
social entrepreneurship, have gained attention due to their promise of alleviating social problems  
such as poverty, discrimination or exclusion. However, social entrepreneurship and its function 
within the economic system remains undertheorized including how social entrepeneurship might 
interact with commercial entrepeneurship. For instance, would policy makers supporting one 
form of entrepreneurship thereby crowd out or reinforce the other form? Does social 
entrepreneurship compete with commercial entrepreneurship perhaps for talent and other 
resources, or could high rates of social entrepreneurship be beneficial to commercial 
entrepreneurship? We draw on social capital theory and institutional theory to consider the 
relationship between social and commercial entrepreneurship, as well as to theorize about 
national institutions facilitating the emergence of both. In doing so, we extend nation-level social 
capital theory by highlighting an emergent, bottom-up process of social capital creation. We 
maintain that the effects of social entrepreneurship may be wider than directly addressing social 
needs: it also creates a form of social capital appropriable by commercial entrepreneurs. 
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Nation-level social capital theory has focussed on social capital as ―endowed‖, rooted in 
long lasting, difficult to change cultural traits (e.g. Adler & Kwon, 2002; Westlund & Adams, 
2010); we add to this by highlighting an emergent, bottom-up process of social capital creation. 
Moreoever, common indicators of nation-level social capital focus on cohesive networks and 
associations, which do not automatically generate positive externalities because the gains may 
come at the cost of excluding outsiders (Portes, 1998). In contrast, we posit social 
entrepreneurship as a source of social capital with strong  positive externalities.   
The actions of social entrepreneurs and the enterprises they create enhance cooperative 
norms within a nation, providing positive signals about caring for others through working to 
support societal objectives and group needs. Through their work, they build collaborative 
relationships with stakeholders, bridging diverse social groups and overcoming social exclusion 
by building new ties across social groups. By undertaking other-regarding exchanges, social 
entrepreneurs enhance cooperative norms and weak-tie social capital. This lowers transaction 
costs, making it easier for commercial entrepreneurs to access new information, resources and 
opportunities. We therefore respond to Zahra and Wright‘s (2011) call for further research on the 
linkages between social and commercial entrepreneurship, and propose the concept of social 
capital as appropriate lenses to apply to this relationship. Our new nation-level measure views 
social capital as cooperative norms and emphasizes its development as being constructible 
through self-organisation rather than as being endowed. Our study also advances past research 
into social entrepreneurship which has been primarily conceptual or case-based in nature (see for 
instance, Dacin et al., 2010, Short et al., 2009, Nicholls, 2010).  
Our argument also extends the literature which presents social entrepreneurship as an 
important aspect of institutional change in that social entrepreneurs create frameworks for market 
transactions that can later be exploited by commercial entrepreneurs (Mair & Marti, 2006, 2009; 
Mair, Marti & Ventresca, 2012; McMullen, 2011). Thus, social entrepreneurs may extend market 
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opportunities to those for whom access was previously difficult, overcoming economic as well as 
social barriers; their experimentation with organisational forms and business solutions widens 
the scope for market transactions. In that process, social entrepreneurship can create social 
capital specifically appropriable for commercial entrepreneurs. 
 Given the hypothesized benefits of social entrepreneurship, it is of theoretical and policy 
interest to identify supporting institutions. This also helps us better to understand the roots of 
change in social structures. Rather than always seeing social capital as anchored in stable cultural 
traits, it may in addition be linked to national institutions amenable to change. While we 
understand relatively well which institutions enable individuals to undertake commercial 
entrepreneurship (see e.g. McMullen, Bagby & Palich, 2008; Autio & Acs 2009; Aidis, Estrin & 
Mickiewicz, 2012; Estrin, Korosteleva & Mickiewicz, 2012), the impact of institutional 
arrangements on individual agency in the social sphere is less well understood. We therefore 
develop and test new hypotheses about the impact of formal institutions on social 
entrepreneurship. Our approach to institutional theory builds on Williamson (2000) and Estrin et 
al. (2012), and distinguishes between formal institutions at the constitutional and regulatory 
level. This allows us to extend the theory of institutional voids in arguing that strong regulatory 
institutions will have a weaker effect on social than commercial entrepreneurship, while strong 
institutions at the constitutional level will be supportive of both forms of entrepreneurship.  
We develop a cross-level model hypothesizing nation-level influences on individual 
entrepreneurial decisions, which we test by constructing a large cross-national data set, 
consisting of population representative surveys from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) combined with data on institutions. We employ multi-level modelling to test our 
hypothses and therefore respond to Payne, Moore, Griffis and Aurty‘s (2011) call for multilevel 
work on social capital and entrepreneurship. We document the existence of reinforcing dynamics 
between the two forms of entrepreneurship in which we emphasise the role of social capital. 
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 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Definition of Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship  
We adopt the definition of entrepreneurship as ―new entry‖: the efforts towards the 
creation of  viable business resulting from an individual‘s occupational choice to work for his/her 
own account (e.g., Gartner, 1989; Hebert & Link, 1982). Commercial entrepreneurs rely on 
market exchange and have the objective to maximise profits while social entrepreneurs supply 
needs that are not addressed by for-profit ventures (McMullen, 2011). Practitioners and 
researchers increasingly acknowledge the potential of entrepreneurship to create ―social wealth‖ 
(Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum & Shulman, 2009).
1
 Commercial and social entrepreneurs are 
therefore distinguished by their primary objectives (profits and social wealth respectively); they 
also have much in common, such as the central role of innovation, the necessity to bear risk and 
to invest. 
 
Social Entrepreneurship and Constructible Social Capital 
 To date, there is only limited theorizing about social capital at the national level. At the 
individual and group level, social capital is typically referred to as the ability to access resources 
through social relationships (e.g., Payne et al., 2011). Two types of social capital are commonly 
differentiated. First, bonding/strong-tie social capital refers to the cohesion within small groups. 
However, enhancing cooperation within a smaller group can come at the cost of restricting 
individual freedom, the exclusion of outsiders, or even hostility towards them (Portes, 1998; 
Portes & Landolt, 2000). Second, bridging/weak-tie social capital enables contact and 
                                                          
1
 Zahra et al. (2009) propose  three different types of social entrepreneurs: social bricoleurs, social constructionists 
and social engineers. Social bricoleurs are acting locally, responding to locally discovered opportunities with locally 
available resources. Many social entrepreneurs will start as social bricoleurs. Some may may go on to realize that a 
specific need is more widespread and their solution is scalable and  create organisations with a wider scope 
(becoming social constructionists), or challenge the wider institutional structures (becoming social engineers). 
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collaboration among members of diverse and previously unconnected groups. This form is 
particularly applicable to the national level where social capital comes with positive externalities 
that relate to aspects that could be alternatively labelled as weak ties (Granovetter, 1973), 
bridging (Adler & Kwon, 2002), wide radius of trust (Fukuyama, 2001) or bonds of solidarity 
within a given community/nation (Portes & Landolt, 2000). With a growing ―radius of trust‖, 
more external effects are being internalised, strangers are no longer seen as outsiders and societal 
norms of cooperation emerge (Fukuyama, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010; 
Westlund & Adams, 2010). 
The presence of far reaching weak ties within a nation lowers transaction costs by 
facilitating access to new and more valuable information and other resources. It also enhances 
mobility and can mitigate social exclusion, enabling more individuals to access new 
opportunities and resources. Widespread weak tie social capital within a nation can therefore 
support entrepreneurship (Kwon & Arenius, 2010; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010).  
 Because social capital at the national level is seen as ―endowed‖, rooted in stable cultural 
traits (Adler & Kwon, 2002, Westlund & Adams, 2010), it is usually viewed as irrelevant from a 
policy perspective (Portes, 1998; Fukuyama, 2001). However, social entrepreneurship, by 
supporting societal objectives and group needs, builds cooperation and goodwill and hence  
social entrepreneurs‘ actions and the enterprises they create enhance cooperative norms within a 
nation. Thus, social entrepreneurship offers a view on nation-level social capital which is 
constructible and growing through use.  
Social entrepreneurship can generate these positive spillover effects because it reflects a 
bottom-up social self-organisation that aims to benefit others. It provides positive signals about 
caring for others, and examples of goodwill and cooperation. Moreover, the organizations that 
social entrepreneurs create are often built to overcome social exclusion and to enhance market 
participation by those in society who are underprivileged. Thus, they create new ties, often at the 
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cost of breaking existing social barriers (Mair & Marti, 2009, Mair et al., 2012). Addressing 
social problems which are multi-faceted, social entrepreneurs build collaborative relationships 
with a wide range of stakeholders thereby cutting across and bridging diverse groups (e.g., 
DiDomenico, Haugh & Tracey, 2010; Peredo & Chrisman, 2006).  
It is this outreaching aspect, widening Fukuyama‘s (2001) ‗radius of trust‘, that may 
make social entrepreneurship a factor in building ties based on the nationwide community rather 
than local social segmentation. Mair and Marti (2009) view social entrepreneurship as closely 
related to institutional entrepreneurship; an argument we extend by stressing that the informal 
institutions built by the ‗social bricoleurs‘ (Zahra et al., 2009) have a strong component of social 
capital, creating positive externalities. Through repeated examples of other-regarding exchanges 
that bridge diverse groups of stakeholders, social entrepreneurs enhance cooperative norms and 
construct social capital that can be appropriated by commercial entrepreneurs.  
 Prior research on nation-level social capital has emphasized participation in voluntary 
associations, arguing that it increases the trust between participating members (e.g. Putnam, 
1993). However, such organisations can become embedded in the social and political 
establishment and thereby adopt para-state characteristics that have little to do with building 
societal norms of cooperation (see Olson, 1982). In contrast, an organisation with social 
objectives, created from below, can generate cooperative norms that transcend its organisational 
boundaries. This resonates with research by Krishna (2007) who finds cooperative norms to be 
linked to self-initiated community-based organisations. Thus, social entrepreneurship based on 
social self-organisation reflects a different ‗quality‘ of constructible social capital2. 
 As a source of social capital, social entrepreneurship may have important benefits for 
commercial entrepreneurs. Cooperative norms indicated by the prevalence of social 
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 In this, our theoretical perspective combines positive aspects of social capital, with Olson‘s emphasis on beneficial 
effects of innovation and change in social structures (Olson, 1982). 
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entrepreneurship can lower transaction cost and thus can make it easier for commercial 
entrepreneurs to access new information and resources as well as to  identify new opportunities 
(Kwon & Arenius, 2010; Stephan & Uhlaner, 2010). Hence we propose: 
H1: The likelihood that individuals in a country undertake commercial entrepreneurial 
activity is positively influenced by the national prevalence rate of social entrepreneurship 
in that country. 
 
Formal Institutions and Entrepreneurial Activity 
 Institutions are the ―humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction.‖ (North, 1991, p.97), shapingthe national framework within which individuals 
choose commercial and social entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990; Baker, Gedajlovic and & 
Lubatkin, 2005). To date, entrepreneurship theory has been largely concerned with institutions 
influencing the former rather than the latter. Here we focus on the formal institutions that 
facilitate social entrepreneurship, which helps us to shed further light on the origins of social 
capital rooted in institutions open to change by policy makers.  
To consider formal institutions, we draw on Williamson‘s (2000) hierarchy of institutions 
framework
3
 but follow Estrin et al‘s (2012) distinction between the constitutional and the  
regulatory levels, which corresponds  to what Ostrom (1994) labels ‗constitutional choice‘ and 
‗collective choice‘. Thus, Estrin et al. (2012) synthesize formal institutions into two dimensions, 
representing (1) the higher order (constitutional) features and (2) lower order regulations and 
policies. These relate to (1) the rule of law, secure property rights, and effective constraints on 
the arbitrary power of the executive branch of the government, seen as a closely related cluster of 
constitutional characteristics, and (2) the scale and scope of the government covering an 
interrelated cluster of collective choice features that include the size of government spending, the 
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 In an alternative approach, Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, van Essen, and Oosterhout (2012) distinguish between 
protective and input-providing market-supporting institutions. 
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scope of the welfare system, the level of taxation and the extent of regulation. They find both to 
be related to commercial entrepreneurship. 
 The constitutional level of the institutional framework defines the security of property 
rights. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that effective constraints on arbitrary action by the 
executive branch of the government decrease the risk of expropriation. Strong property rights 
promote commercial entrepreneurial entry by fostering individuals‘ agency beliefs (Harper, 
2003), enabling predictable and fair exchange and permitting the appropriation of the economic 
value created. But individual agency lies at the heart of all entrepreneurship, so social as well as 
commercial entrepreneurship are hampered by lack of predictability or even intimidation by 
those in power. Hence strong constitutional level institutions will be conducive to both forms of 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, arbitrary government may work strongly against social initiatives, and 
may apply official means of violence to pursue powerful private interests. Evans (1996) provides 
multiple examples from Latin America and Africa that weak rule of law and centralised and 
arbitrary government are detrimental to local self-organisation. Moreover, barriers created by 
weak institutional environments may generate self-fulfilling prophecies: those excluded in their 
access to institutionalized markets due to weak rule of law tend also to scale down their 
aspirations (Banerjee & Duflo, 2011). Accordingly, we posit: 
H2: The likelihood that individuals in a country undertake a) commercial and b) social 
entrepreneurial activity is positively influenced by effective constraints on the arbitrary 
power of the government in that country. 
 Estrin et al. (2012) propose regulations and policies as the second dimension of formal 
institutions determining commercial entrepreneurship (also Fogel, Hawk, Morck & Yeung, 
2006) operationalized as the scale of government activity in the national economy, and 
associated with lower prevalence of commercial entrepreneurship (also Van Stel, Storey & 
Thurik, 2007; Nissan, Castaño & Carrasco, 2012). Government activity crowds out private 
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commercial initiatives through the effects of tax and welfare payments on incentives to work and 
invest, which are felt especially keenly in the area of individual agency. Taxes and welfare 
provision affect entrepreneurial entry via their impact on expected (lower) returns to commercial 
entrepreneurial activity and its opportunity cost (Parker, 2009). Higher levels of welfare support 
provide alternative sources of income and may reduce the incentives for individuals to choose 
commercial entrepreneurship over employment.
4
  
 These arguments are equally relevant for social entrepreneurs who also choose self-
employment over alternative occupations. However, the impact may be less demotivating 
because social entrepreneurs have objectives in addition to personal enrichment and hence may 
be less affected by fiscal incentives. Moreoever, institutional void theory (Dacin et al., 2010; 
Mair & Marti, 2009) suggests that there will be more need for social enterprises when the 
government is small, in order to substitute for missing social provision. The theory argues that 
deficiencies in the provision of social goods, for example at low levels of economic 
development, leads to demand for social entrepreneurial activity (see also Baker et al., 2005). 
Thus, a smaller government may create a demand for social entrepreneurship as individuals react 
to the social needs they see around them
5
. We therefore propose that the association between  
government activism  and both commercial and social entrepreneurship will be negative though 
the disincentive effects will be felt more keenly by commercial entrepreneurs.  
H3: The likelihood that individuals undertake (a) commercial and (b) social 
entrepreneurial activity is negatively influenced by government activism. (c) However, 
the negative effect will be more marked for commercial than for social entrepreneurship. 
 
                                                          
4
 Government revenues could be used to support entrepreneurship, ameliorating the relationship. The observed 
empirical relationship relates to middle and high income countries, and could become hump-shaped if the full 
spectrum of government spending was available for testing. 
5
 Social initiatives and government may have complementary effects (Evans, 1996; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) if  
social enterprises partner with government. Our focus is on the effects of government size on entry; complementary 
effects  are more relevant  when social entrepreneurs become established.  
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Figure 1 summarizes the three hypotheses in our multi-level model, which is a mixed 
determinant cross-level model (cf. Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Payne et al., 2011). It contains 
cross-level predictions (country to individual level) formulated in H1 through H3 as well as 
individual-level control variables. 
{Figure 1} 
 
EMPIRICAL DESIGN AND METHODS 
Datasets  
To test our hypotheses, our dataset should contain information on individual occupational 
choices between employment, social entrepreneurship and commercial entrepreneurship, and 
cover a large variety of countries with respect to institutions. We therefore merge a unique 
dataset on social entrepreneurship (covering more than 114,000 individuals in 47 countries in 
2009) collected by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), with a variety of national-level 
institutional indicators and controls. 
 GEM is one of only two available international comparative datasets on entrepreneurship; 
the other is World Bank ‗Entrepreneurship Survey‘. Acs, Desai and Klapper (2008) compare 
them, showing how differences can be attributed to the fact that World Bank data focuses on 
registered companies only, while GEM captures all entrepreneurial activity. GEM thus matches 
our theoretical framework in that we concentrate on individual occupational choice, without 
focusing on the issue of registration
6
. 
We utilize the GEM 2009 adult population survey, which has social entrepreneurship as its 
special theme and contains questions uniquely constructed to address our theoretical concerns. 
The survey instrument was  developed via earlier pilot studies on social entrepreneurship
7
 and its 
questions were anchored in the social entrepreneurship literature (see Lepoutre et al., 2011).  
                                                          
6
 GEM started in 1998, with cross-national comparative data from 2001 (Reynolds, Bosma, Autio, Hunt, De Bono, 
Servais, Lopez-Garcia & Chin, 2005). Publications were initially descriptive, but more recently, have  started 
appearing in leading scholarly journals. 
7
 Implemented by the UK team (e.g., Harding & Cowling, 2004; Harding, 2006; Levie et al., 2006). 
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With very few exceptions, the data for each country consist of representative samples of at least 
2,000 individuals drawn from the working age population, which avoids the potential selectivity 
bias of studies of existing entrepreneurs
8
. Taking account of missing values, we use 114,341 
observations from 47 countries.
9
 
Our methodology also mitigates the impact of one of the most widespread criticisms of 
GEM: the use of single-item questions and dichotomous yes/no answer categories. This is 
challenging if potentially ambiguous, attitudinal and perceptual constructs are measured, but less 
problematic when directly observable behaviours such as starting/owner-managing a social 
enterprise or commercial business are captured (e.g. Bergvist & Rossiter, 2007).  
 
Sample, Measures and Modelling Strategy  
 Dependent Variables: Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship. The GEM 
methodology is designed to capture a wide range of business creation activities (Reynolds et al., 
2005), distinguishing between:  
(1) individuals who intend to create a new venture,  
(2) those in the process of establishing a new firm (start-ups, or nascent entrepreneurs),  
(3) those operating young firms (under 3.5 years), and  
(4) owners-managers of established businesses (3.5 years and older).  
 
 These four activities were identified separately for commercial and for social 
entrepreneurship, so some respondents could be active in more than one category (Bosma et al., 
2010; Lepoutre et al., 2011). Our two dependent variables are the individual likelihood of 
commercial and social entrepreneurial entry respectively (category (2) above), i.e. start-up or 
                                                          
8
 GEM surveys were completed through phone calls, or face-to-face interviews where low telephone density could 
create a bias. 
9
 Algeria, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Peru, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, UK, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Yemen. 
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nascent activity. We leave entrepreneurial intentions aside (i.e. category (1)) and include jointly 
(3) and (4) as existing social and commercial entrepreneurs respectively in our set of independent 
variables.  
To be classified as starting-up (nascent) commercial entrepreneurs, respondents 
answered affirmative that: a) they are alone or with others currently trying to start a new 
business, b) they have actively taken action to start the new business over the past 12 months
10
 
and c) they will at least part-own this business. They are classified as young or established 
entrepreneurs if their business has paid salaries, wages or in kind for at least three months. 
Respondents were asked a corresponding set of questions about starting and owner-managing 
―any kind of activity, organization or initiative that has a particularly social, environmental or 
community objective‖ to be identified as social entrepreneurs (see: Mair & Marti, 2006; Zahra et 
al., 2009).  
 Measuring entrepreneurial activity by start-ups carries the risk that the start-up will not 
survive, but it has still been popular in empirical research for two reasons. First, the newness of a 
start-up activity reflects a key aspect of entrepreneurship (Zahra & Wright, 2011).  Second, in the 
context of building a formal estimable model, the focus on nascent entrepreneurial activity 
alleviates endogeneity problems that are difficult to overcome in the context of cross-sectional 
data. For example, some individual characteristics, including attitudes and resources, may not be 
exogenous for business owners who have already run their own ventures for some time. More 
importantly, we can use the distinction between nascent and existing businesses to alleviate the 
simultaneity suggested by Figure 1. 
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 The exact wording is: a) You are, alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, including any self-
employment or selling any goods or services to others, b) Over the past twelve months have you done anything to 
help start a new business, such as looking for equipment or a location, organizing a start-up team, working on a 
business plan, beginning to save money, or any other activity that would help launch a business?, c) Will you 
personally own all, part, or none of this business?, and for identification of young/established business owner-
managers: d) Has the new business paid any salaries, wages, or payments in kind, including your own, for more than 
three months?  
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 Country-Level Predictors (H1, H2, H3). To test for H1, we use the country prevalence 
rate of young and established social entrepreneurs as our indicator of entrepreneurship social 
capital; an informal national institution
11
.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3 require us to specify the appropriate measures of formal institutions 
across countries. For the quality of property rights (H2), we use the Polity IV indicator of 
efficient constraints on the arbitrary power of the executive branch of the government,  
“constraints on executive” (Estrin et al., 2012)12. Government activism (H3) is measured by the 
scale of government activity: the size of the government. We use Heritage Foundation data; their 
own indicator is the quadratic transformation of the ratio of government expense to GDP. We 
follow Reynolds (2010) and  transform this back to the simple ratio of government expense to 
GDP. Though we argued that a larger government correlates with a more extensive welfare 
system, we are unable to find a direct measure of the latter with sufficient coverage. However, 
correlations of welfare spending indicators with our variable ―size of government‖ support our 
argument. For instance, the size of government correlates r = .87, p<.001 (N=32) with the per 
cent of GDP spend on total public social protection and health care (OECD, 2011); r = .75, 
p<.001 (N=50) with expenditure on health as per cent of GDP (UNDP, 2011); and r = .58, 
p<.001 (N=33) with expenditure on education as per cent of GDP (UNDP, 2011). 
 In terms of multi-level theory our formal institutional variables (constraints on the 
executive and government activism) are country-level concepts with so-called global unit 
properties, while our indicator of social capital (the country prevalence rate of social 
entrepreneurs) is a concept following a compilation process of emergence and is characterized by 
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 This measure excludes nascent social entrepreneurship to alleviate simultaneity bias with our dependent variable. 
12
 Many scholars have relied on the Heritage Foundation–Wall Street Journal measure of property rights. Aidis et al. 
(2012) argue that this integrates two dimensions of property rights, namely protection from arbitrary government 
and protection of private contracts. Given our theoretical framework, we follow Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) in 
believing the protection from arbitrary government to be more fundamental. 
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descriptive configural unit properties (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Payne et al., 2011). Unlike the 
more common consensus-based emergent multi-level concepts, our social capital indicator 
describes a configuration, i.e. the share of social entrepreneurs among each country‘s population. 
 
 Country-level Control Variables. Rates of entrepreneurship vary with levels of 
development (Lepoutre et al., 2011). We follow Aidis et al. (2012) and Autio and Acs (2010) in 
controlling for this by using per capita GDP at purchasing power parity;
13
 we also include the 
growth rate of GDP. 
While we focus on the nation-level stock of social entrepreneurship as one indicator for 
social capital, for robustness we explore how the relationships are affected by including in the 
entrepreneurship equations the two most widely used measures of nation-level social capital 
(Kwon & Arenius, 2010; Westlund & Adam 2010): generalized trust and associational 
membership (see Table 1 for details). In addition, we follow Audretsch and Keilbach (2004) in 
controling for the stock of commercial entrepreneurs, using the country prevalence rate of young 
and established commercial entrepreneurs. We lag  all macroeconomic and institutional variables 
by one year to reduce potential endogeneity between these variables and social and commercial 
entrepreneurship.  
 
 Individual-Level Control Variables.  We also follow the literature on other controls. Thus 
we include a dummy variable for the owner-manager of a young or established commercial or 
social enterprise as one proxy for experience. We also include a dummy variable for gender and 
two variables to test for the effect of education: secondary and tertiary education respectively. 
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 Following Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik & Reynolds (2005), we also experimented with its square term to control 
for possible U-shaped effects of GDP on entrepreneurship. This was not significant.  
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We further include (as, e.g., Autio & Acs, 2010; Aidis et al. 2012) a measure of access to 
capital, of knowing an entrepreneur, age and current employement status . 
Definitons and data sources are summarized in Table 1. The individual-level correlation 
matrix is presented in Table 2 and national-level correlations are presented in Table 3. 
 
{Table 1, Table 2, Table 3} 
 
Estimation 
 We use multilevel modelling on our cross-country, cross-individual dataset because it has 
a hierarchical structure in which individuals represent level one and countries represent level 
two. Individuals are not randomly distributed across countries; rather individuals living in the 
same country share some experiences that are different from individuals living in another; hence 
individuals from the same country are more likely to exhibit similar patterns in their behaviour. 
In terms of regression models observations are no longer independent, i.e. part of the error 
associated with estimating individuals‘ propensity to engage in entrepreneurship is 
systematically influenced by country factors. OLS regression models are not robust to non-
independence of errors terms and standard error estimates are biased so the significance levels of 
OLS regression coefficients are unreliable (e.g. Bliese, 2002; Ployhart, Holtz & Bliese, 2002; 
Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal & Pickles, 2005). Multi-level modelling take this into account.  
 We examined whether the use of multilevel modelling is supported statistically. First, we 
tested the significance of country effects (random intercepts). We found evidence for significant 
country-level variance (at p<0.001) in addition to individual-level variance. The residual 
interclass correlation (ICC1) indicated that 14% of the variation in commercial start-up and 19% 
in the variation of social start-up resides at the country-level (compared to the individual-level). 
Next, we included the country-level averages of all individual effects, which reduced the residual 
interclass correlation to 5% for commercial start-up, and to 8% for social start-up. In both cases 
17 
we performed a likelihood ratio (LR) test to compare both types of specifications. These 
suggested that adding the country-level averages significantly reduced the unexplained country-
level variance in both commercial and social start-up (at p<0.001). Third, we added our macro 
level variables representing formal institutions, GDP per capita and GDP growth. For 
commercial start-up, this further reduced residual interclass correlation to 3%, and the 
corresponding LR test was significant again at p<0.001. However, adding formal institutions and 
GDP had little impact on social start-up: residual interclass correlation was reduced by less than 
1% and the LR test was insignificant. Nevertheless, because they did not affect other results, in 
models reported below we retain those variables for the sake of comparison. 
 Our estimating equations are specified to include  individual effects (subscript i), and 
country averages (subscript j blow). For instance, coefficient β8j for InEmploymentij represents an 
individual effect of being in employment, and coefficient γ08 for InEmploymentj represents a 
country effect of the employment prevalence rate. Our full regression model (corresponding to 
specification (1a) and (1b) in Table 4 below) is therefore specified in two-parts following the 
notation in Bliese (2002)
14
: 
Startupij = β0j + β1j( CurrComEij) + β2j(CurrSocEij) + β3j(Femaleij) + β4j(EducSecpostij) + 
β5j(EducPostij )+β6j(Ageij) +β7j(AgeSqij) +β8j(InEmploymentij )+β9j(BusAngelij) + 
β10j(KnowsEntrepij) + rij         (1) 
β0j= γ00 + γ01(CurrComEj) + γ02(CurrSocEj) + γ03(Femalej) + γ04(EducSecpostj) + γ05(EducPostj) 
+ γ06(Agej)+ γ07(AgeSqj )+ γ08(InEmploymentj )+ γ09(BusAngelj )+ γ10(KnowsEntrepj)+  
γ11(l.ExecConstrj) + γ12(l.GovSizej) + γ13(l.GDPpcj) + γ14(l.GDPgrowthj) + u0j  (2) 
Startupij is our measure of entrepreneurial activity, used in models 1a through 5a for commercial 
entrepreneurs and in models 1b through 5b for social entrepreneurs. All our models have a 
similar structure. In equation (1), the individual engagement in start-up is a function of the 
country group intercept (β0j) and a linear component of individual-level control variables (e.g., 
currently running and owning a commercial enterprise CurrComEij) plus some random error (rij). 
                                                          
14
 We are assuming that the slopes of individual-level effects on individual start-up choice are similar across 
countries. 
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Equation (2) specifies the group intercept (β0j) as a function of a common intercept (γ00) and a 
linear component made up of the country-level average of all individual-level control variables 
(e.g., the country prevalence rate of commercial entrepreneurship CurrComEj), or their country 
effects, as discussed above, as well as our formal institution predictor variables, GDP and GDP 
growth plus a random, country-level error term (u0j). The country prevalence rate of social 
entrepreneurship (CurrSocEj), is our indicator of country-level social capital.  
 We conducted additional Wald tests to establish whether the individual-level effects are 
different from the country-mean effects for each variable which are included both as an 
individual-level and a country-level aggregate in the equation (e.g. age, gender), based on 
specifications (1a) and (1b) in Table 4. Where this test result was not significant in both the 
social and commercial start-up equation, we removed the country-mean effect. This was the case 
for the country-means of gender (y03 (Femalej)), employment status (y08 (InEmploymentj)), and 
knowing an entrepreneur (y10 (KnowsEntrepj)) resulting in specifications 2a and 2b in Table 4. In 
specifications 3a and 3b we additionally removed country means where these effects were not 
significantly different from the corresponding individual effects in a given single equation. 
 Tables 2 and 3 do not suggest problems of multicollinearity. Nonetheless, erring on the 
side of caution, we performed a battery of detailed tests, running regression models based on all 
sets of our explanatory variables, taking each explanatory variable as a dependent in turn
15
. This 
allowed us to identify a number of potential multicollinearity problems concerning the country 
mean variables. We then faced the following dilemma: while including country mean effects for 
all variables is recommended based on the LR test results reported above, a few of these are also 
a source of multicollinearity, specifically partial correlations between the age variables and 
executive constraints are high. Thus multicollinearity marginally reduces the significance of 
                                                          
15
 These could also be identified empirically by measures such as variance inflation factors (VIF). We prefer our 
approach, because VIF do not tell us what in the underlying partial correlation structure is causing the problems. 
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executive constraints, because countries with a higher average age have also stronger institutions. 
However, bearing in mind the potential for attenuation bias, we based our specification choice on 
the LR test and kept the corresponding variables in our models. We also verified if mean-
centring all continuous variables alleviates the multicollinearity problem, in particular that we 
use both age and age squared. In fact the results were only altered in the range of second and 
third decimal points and significance levels were virtually the same in all cases. 
Finally, to control for interdependencies and cross-correlations when predicting 
commercial and social start-up, we estimate these two jointly using MLwiN software. We report 
results from bivariate, multi-level logit regressions with odds ratios and their standard errors. 
 
RESULTS 
 In Tables 4 and 5 (models 1 through 6), all models ‖a‖ relate to estimations for 
commercial start-up and models ―b‖ are estimations for social start-up. We present two sets of 
estimations; the first set are our core results (Table 4, models 1 through 3); in models (2) and (3) 
we drop country-mean effects where those were not distinguished from individual effects, as 
discussed above. The second set of estimations (Table 5, models 4 and 5) are robustness checks 
adding the two standard country-level measures of social capital discussed above. 
 
Country-level Social Entrepreneurship as Constructible Nation-Level Social Capital (H1) 
 We find strong support for  H1: The country-level prevalence rate of social entrepreneurs 
has a significant positive effect on the likelihood of individuals becoming commercial 
entrepreneurs (Table 4, models 1a, 2a, and 3a).  
 
Country-level Formal Institutions as Predictors of Entrepreneurship (H2, H3) 
 We also find support for H2a and b. Constraints on the executive have the expected 
positive effect on the likelihood of social start-up once we remove some sources of collinearity 
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based on the Wald tests described above, i.e. redundant county-level effects of individual 
variables (Table 4, models 2b and 3b, row 21). This holds even if we keep the country mean age 
variables that are also collinear. Constraints on the executive are significantly positively 
associated with commercial start-up (Table 4, models 1a through 3a row 21) and the coefficient 
difference Wald test yields a non-significant difference (Chi-square (df=1) = 0.00, n.s.) 
indicating that social and commercial start-up are equally influenced by the quality of the 
institutional framework.  
A similar pattern of results emerges regarding H3. Once we remove sources of 
collinearity, government size has the predicted negative effect on social (Table 4, models 2b and 
3b, row 22) and commercial start-up supporting H3a and H3b. The coefficient difference Wald 
test reveals a marginally stronger negative effect of government size on commercial compared to 
social start-up (Chi-square (df=1) =2.86, p<.10) supporting H3c.  
 
Individual-level Controls   
 We find that being the owner of a young or established social enterprise is positively 
associated with the likelihood of commercial start-up (Table 4, models 1a through 3a, row 1) as 
well as with starting another social enterprise (Models 1b through 3b, row 1). Individuals who 
are young or established commercial entrepreneurs are less likely to start another commercial 
enterprise (Table 4, Models 1a through 3a, row 3), but there is no significant association with 
social start-up (Models 1b through 3b, row 3).  
Furthermore, women are less likely than men to become either social or commercial 
entrepreneurs (Table 4, model 1 through 3, row 5) but more likely to be social as compared to 
commercial entrepreneurs (Wald test, Chi-square (df=1) = 25.19, p<.001). Similarly, secondary 
and tertiary education are positively related to commercial and social start-up (Table 4, row 7 
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and 9) but tertiary education has a stronger effect on social start-up (Chi-square (df=1) = 7.12, 
p<.01, in contrast Chi-square (df=1) = 1.30, n.s. for secondary education)
16
.  
 
Further Results at the Country-level 
 The country-level rate of young and established commercial entrepreneurship has a 
negative effect on individual social start-up (Table 4, Models 1b-3b, row 4). Thus, while we find 
the expected positive effect of country-level social entrepreneurship on commercial start-up 
(H1), the reverse does not hold; individuals are less likely to become social entrepreneurs in 
countries with high average rates of commercial entrepreneurship. We find that GDP per capita 
has a similarly strong negative effect on both commercial and social entry (Table 4, row 23).  
 Table 5 reports equations that add the two standard measures of social capital, 
membership in associations and generalised trust, as determinants of start-up. We continue to 
find a positive effect of country-level social entrepreneurship on commercial start-up when one 
of the measures, associational membership, is introduced (Table 5, model 5a), but not from the 
other, generalized trust (model 4a). Note however, that adding these new variables comes at a 
cost of restricting the sample from 47 countries to 39 (in model 5a) and 36 countries (in model 
5b). Hence these results rely on more limited variation and need to be treated with caution. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 Our research contributes to the theory of social capital and entrepreneurship in three 
ways. First we propose an emergent, bottom-up process of social capital creation and link it to 
positive spillovers from nation-level rate of social entrepreneurship to individual commercial 
entrepreneurship. Second, we highlight institutional antecedents of social capital generating 
                                                          
16
 Greater access to capital (business angel) and knowing an entrepreneur are each positively related to both 
commercial and social start-up (Table 4, rows 17 and 19). In both cases the relationship is stronger for commercial 
than for social (Chi-square (df=1) = 23.06, p<.001 and 7.89, p<.01 respectively). Individuals in employment are 
more likely to undertake commercial start-up (Table 4, row 15), but there is no significant association with social 
start-up. Finally, the age of the individual shows the conventional inverted U-shaped relationship for both types of 
entrepreneurship (Table 4, rows 11 and 13). 
22 
social entrepreneurship, thereby shedding light on the roots of change in social structures – and 
adding new insights to social capital theory. Third, we put forward a contextualized 
understanding of entrepreneurship as embedded in social capital, national formal institutions as 
well as being influenced by individual characteristics and behaviour.  
 
Constructible Social Capital: Consequences of Social for Commercial Entrepreneurship 
 We find support for the argument that a higher national rate of social entrepreneurship 
increases the likelihood that individuals in that country become commercial entrepreneurs. Our 
research therefore contributes a fresh perspective on social capital, providing an indicator of 
country-level constructible social capital, which is conceptually aligned with the dominant 
definition of nation-level social capital as cooperative norms, and which captures the beneficial 
aspects of change in social structures created from below (Krishna, 2007; Peredo & Chrisman, 
2006). To conceptualize our novel indicator of social capital we followed Payne et al.‘s (2011) 
call for a multilevel perspective on social capital. In particular, we drew on multi-level 
theorizing, distinguishing the individual-level engagement in social enterprise from the country-
level variable; the national rate of social entrepreneurship. The latter has a wider meaning in that 
it serves as an indicator for important social processes related to social capital (see Bliese, Chan 
& Ployhart, 2007). Drawing on existing research we theorized about the emergent process of 
social capital building through social entrepreneurship, particularly the role of repeated other-
regarding exchanges, signalling effects and the building of collaborative relationships and new 
ties across social groups, as well as its specific approbability for commercial enterpeneurship. 
Future research should include direct measures of these generative processes.  
Our novel indicator of social capital complements existing country-level measures  
including generalized trust and associational membership (e.g., Kwon & Arenius, 2010; 
Westlund & Adams, 2010). In fact, these two established indicators of social capital show little 
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relationship with commercial entrepreneurship. This supports our argument highlighting the 
importance of constructible, self-organisation facets of social capital appropriable by commercial 
entrepreneurs. However, the substantial positive country-level correlation of social 
entrepreneurship rate and generalized trust (Table 3) suggests why the coefficient on social 
entrepreneurship prevalence rate is less significant if generalised trust is included in the model. It 
indicates a partial mediation effect (e.g. Zhao, Lynch & Chen, 2010) such that generalized trust 
supports social entrepreneurship, which in turn influences individual commercial entry. In 
addition, the national rate of social entrepreneurship is more closely correlated with generalized 
trust than with associational membership, which supports our proposition that social capital built 
by social entrepreneurship indicates the existence of cooperative norms of which generalized 
trust is arguably another, albeit static and stable, indicator (Fukuyama, 2001). Furthermore, there 
is no significant effect of associational membership on individual-level social entry, as would be 
expected if new social enterprises were spin-outs of larger social organisations – similar to new 
commercial enterprises being spun-out by existing firms (Thornton, 1999). Our findings indicate 
that social entrepreneurs originate elsewhere.  
 The positive impact of social on individual commercial entrepreneurship via social 
capital may be contrasted with the negative effect of the country-level rate of commercial 
entrepreneurship on individual social entry. High national rates of commercial entrepreneurship 
reduce the opportunities available for social entrepreneurs. Unlike commercial entrepreneurs, 
social entrepreneurs may address activities not yet well framed by markets but open them up for 
commercial exploitation once new organisational forms and business solutions have been 
developed (e.g., Mair et al., 2012; McMullen, 2011).  
  Our findings on formal institutions shed light on the micro-foundations of social capital 
creation. We find a strong rule of law that facilitates exchange and supports agency to have a 
positive effect on social entry and thereby, over time, helps to create the informal national 
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institution of social capital. This extends social capital research by adding novel insights about 
which institutions may facilitate its creation. Previous  research has instead concentrated on 
debating the state‘s role in creating social capital (e.g., Evans, 1996; Woolcock & Narayan, 
2000). Our research also alludes to the broader question how constraints and opportunites 
originating from formal institutions can shape informal institutions. Here, we broaden the 
Williamson‘s (2000) framework; the latter suggests that linkages only relate to the impact of 
informal on formal institutions.  
  
Formal Institutions, Institutional Voids and Entrepreneurial Activity 
 We find that entrepreneurship is more likely to thrive in institutional contexts with a 
strong rule of law. This is consistent with the notion that all entrepreneurial activity – 
commercial or social - benefits from the predictability, and the  level playing field offered by 
non-arbitrary government and sound, independent law. While some social entrepreneurs may 
achieve extraordinary results in dysfunctional institutional contexts (e.g. Yunus, 1998), such a 
route to social entrepreneurship may not always be an option.  
 With regard to the second aspect of formal institutions – government activism - we find 
support for the predicted negative effect of government size on social entrepreneurship, thereby 
extending Estrin et al.‘s (2012) findings. However, while the disincentive effects of a more 
active government sector demotivate both commercial and social entrepreneurs, the crowding out 
is weaker for social entrepreneurs. 
 Our results therefore provide a more differentiated understanding of institutional void 
theory, based on our distinction between two dimensions of formal institutions; constitutional-
level institutional quality and government activism. We show that social entrepreneurship thrives 
in countries with strong institutional quality. This is not inconsistent with the possibility that 
social entrepreneurs can have an enormous impact on their environment in less developed 
25 
economies; Zahra et al.‘s (2009) examples of Social Engineers are mainly from the developing 
world. At the same time, our results on government activism are consistent with the institutional 
void perspective in that the limited provision of government services creates demand for social 
self-organisation. 
 
The Consequences of Social for Commercial Entrepreneurship at the Individual Level 
Individual social entrepreneurs, in addition to being more likely to start another new 
social initiative, are also more likely to start up a commercial enterprise. Thus, it is probably not 
correct to conceptualise social and commercial entrepreneurship as being in competition for the 
efforts and resources of the individual entrepreneur. Rather social entrepreneurship is an 
empowering experience building skills and confidence, which can be used for further 
entrepreneurial activity, both social and commercial. Social entrepreneurship also seems to 
attract people who are not typical commercial entrepreneurs, notably women and the more highly 
educated. Combined with the positive dynamic between the two forms of entrepreneurship, the 
possibility is opened that social entrepreneurship could increase the diversity of those engaged in 
entrepreneurship in a nation. These issues merit more careful research in the future. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
 The literature discusses social capital in a variety of forms and channels. We concentrate 
on the societal level and within that, on weak-tie social capital represented by norms supporting 
cooperation. There may be research potential to explore further links between social capital and 
social entrepreneurship, for example at the individual level concerning local strong and weak 
ties, since these are not addressed in our study.   
 One strength of our study is that we can draw on population representative samples 
across a wide range of countries, which enables us to apply multi-level modelling. Multi-level 
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modelling allows us to test individual-level relationships at the same time as cross-level country-
effects. It also overcomes concerns about biased significance levels in OLS regressions (e.g. 
Bliese, 2002). 
 At the same time, the GEM dataset limits us in the specificity of the results. In particular, 
Zahra et al. (2009) classify social entrepreneurs into three types and argue that behaviour will 
depend in part on these differences in motivation. However, GEM data is not able to distinguish 
between types of social entrepreneurs. There therefore remains a need for research to explore 
contextual variables influencing different social entrepreneur types. Although we have focussed 
on self-organisation, social enterprises might also be created from the outside, for instance 
through employees of international NGO‘s. This type of social enterprise is not represented in 
our data.   
 A further limitation of our dataset is its cross-sectional nature, which affects the tests of 
the consequences of social for commercial entrepreneurship. Some might argue that a common 
underlying and potentially unmeasured variable might be responsible for the spillover effects 
from social to commercial entrepreneurship. While this may be true, we drew on institutional 
economics and comparative entrepreneurship research to ensure that we identify relevant 
variables and include them in our estimations. In addition, we ran bivariate multi-level logistic 
regressions instead of estimating separate models for social and commercial entrepreneurship. 
Such bivariate regressions take cross-correlations between equations into account which would 
occur in the case of unmeasured third variables. We have therefore taken care to account for 
potential alternative explanations through control variables and bivariate modelling and 
alleviated endogeneity by lagging our predictor variables and using stock measures as 
independent and current flow measures as dependent variables. Nonetheless longitudinal studies 
of this phenomenon are certainly desirable to shed more definite light on the causal relationships. 
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 Another concern is that middle and high-income countries tend to be over-represented in 
our sample compared to low-income countries. Thus we may understate potential cross-country 
heterogeneity in institutions. It would also  be helpful to explore in more detail the processes 
whereby social entrepreneurship builds social capital using both longtitudinal data and case 
studies; there are likely mutually reinforcing relationships at play.  
  
Policy and Practical Implications  
 The manner in which social entrepreneurship may bring different people into 
entrepreneurial activity combined with the supportive impact of social entrepreneurship on 
commercial entrepreneurship gives policy makers further reasons to provide support. Our  results 
indicate that social entrepreneurship builds social capital, especially through cooperative norms; 
an informal institution. Policy makers could build on this insight by supporting the relationship-
based exchange logic of social entrepreneurship through opportunities for social entrepreneurs to 
meet and network, and giving legitimacy to the causes they address (Korosec & Berman, 2006). 
Moreover, as exemplified by Banerjee and Duflo (2011), social norms are affected by media: 
culture changes, even if at a slow pace, and it is important to consider which role models are 
promoted in the public sphere. For instance the media could provide social entrepreneurial role 
models in programmes similar to Dragon‘s Den or Shark Tank and beyond.    
Since social entrepreneurship generates spillover effects, this calls for a more careful 
consideration of social capital in policy design focused on enhancing commercial 
entrepreneurship. Commercial entrepreneurship is a social as well as an economic activity and 
enabling social relations and propagating cooperative norms based on weak ties plays a critical 
role in boosting it. Our research also presents further reasons to support a strong rule of law, 
which we find to be important for stimulating all forms of entrepreneurship.  
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 For entrepreneurship education, our research suggests that enhancing social 
entrepreneurship could be an important route to increase entrepreneurship among university 
graduates and women – both topics high on the policy agenda. Thus, universities offering 
courses and business incubators for commercial entrepreneurs should re-think to widen their 
offering to also encompass social entrepreneurship; this is already beginning, but there is need 
for more. Importantly, social entrepreneurship is in many ways more complex than commercial 
since it requires combining business models with an understanding of social change. Hence it 
requires different (societal) value creation logic, and specialist staff to train for these skills.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 Our main contribution is to add to social capital research by conceptualizing and 
validating social entrepreneurship as an indicator of constructible social capital created from 
below. In doing so, we add a fresh perspective to existing research. First, our conceptualization 
closely aligns with the notion that nation-level social capital reflects cooperative norms 
(Fukuyama, 2001; Putnam, 2000). Second, it broadens the range of measures of social capital 
available for nation-level comparative research which has predominantly relied on generalized 
trust and voluntary membership in associations, though the measurement of each is plagued with 
problems (e.g., van Deth, 2003; Westlund & Adams, 2010). Third, our emphasis on constructible 
social capital through self-organisation contrasts with previous comparative research regarding 
social capital as endowed; determined entirely by long-lasting social norms and cultural traits 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002; Westlund & Adams, 2010). Adding a new nation-level measure will 
allow future research to triangulate measurements and advance theorizing about different aspects 
of social capital. Fourth, we add new insights on the origins of social capital by highlighting 
institutional antecedents of social capital generating social entrepreneurship. 
 We also contribute to comparative entrepreneurship research a differentiated 
understanding of the influence of the institutional context. We identify the contextual variables 
which influence commercial and social entrepreneurship, distinguishing between formal and 
informal institutions, and stressing that social capital is at the core of the latter. We also apply a 
differentiation between constitutional quality and government activism to the institutional void 
perspective. We find evidence that the entrepreneurial process, independent of its goals, is 
facilitated by a strong rule of law, and argue that this is not inconsistent with the institutional 
void perspective; indeed we find evidence supporting the institutional void view with regard to 
social needs when governments are less active.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory and variables 
    
Variable Definition Mean S.D. 
Country-level explanatory variables: Business environment & Macroeconomic variables 
Constraints on 
executive (t-1) 
Polity IV ‗Executive Constraints‘; scores from 
1=‖unlimited authority‖ to 7=‖executive parity‖; higher 
value denotes less arbitrariness 
6.14 1.59 
Government 
spending 
Government spending / GDP (authors‘ calculations, 
based on Heritage Foundation data) 
36.55 9.43 
Social 
entrepreneurship 
Country prevalence rate of young and established social 
entrepreneur (percent of the adult population indicating 
that they are currently owner-managing a social 
enterprise) 
.023 .022 
Commercial 
entrepreneurship 
Country prevalence rate of young and established 
commercial entrepreneurs (percent of the adult 
population indicating that they are currently owner-
managing a commercial enterprise)  
.114 .071 
Generalized Trust World Values Survey, percent survey participants 
responding ―most people can be trusted‖ as opposed to 
―one cannot be too careful‖ 
26.73 0.03 
Associational 
membership 
World Values Survey, percent survey participants 
reporting they are active or passive members or belong to 
an association, accumulated over all associations 
declared (so may result in more than 100%). 
140.34 0.18 
GDP per capita ppp 
(t-1) 
GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, constant at 
2000 $USD (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators 2010) 
23,291 12,401 
  GDP growh (t-1) 
Real GDP growth rate (World Bank, World Development 
Indicators database 2010) 
2.74 2.92 
Individual-level Explanatory Variables: Personal characteristics 
Female 1=female, zero otherwise .52 .09 
Education: 
Secondary  
1=respondent has a secondary or post-secondary 
education , 0 otherwise 
.67 
. 
.47 
 
Education: Post-
secondary 
1=respondent has a post-secondary education 
.35 .48 
Social 
entrepreneurship 
experience  
1 = respondent is currently owner-managing a young or 
established social enterprise  .027 .163 
Commercial 
entrepreneurship 
experience 
1 = respondent is currently owner-managing a young or 
established commercial enterprise .145 .352 
Business angel in 
last 3 years 
1=business angel in past three years, 0 otherwise (―Have 
you, in the past three years, personally provided funds for 
a new business started by someone else, excluding any 
purchases of stocks or mutual funds?‖ Answering 
options: ―yes‖ or ―no‖) 
.04 .20 
Know an 
entrepreneur 
1=respondent knows an entrepreneur, 0 otherwise (―Do 
you know someone personally who started a business in 
.37 .48 
35 
the past 2 years?‖.  Answering options ―yes‖ or ―no‖.) 
Age Age of the respondent between 14 and 99 at time of 
interview 
43 14 
Being in 
employment 
1=respondent is in full or part time employment, 0 
otherwise 
.61 .49 
Dependent variables: 
Startup – commercial 1=respondent involved in commercial startup, zero 
otherwise 
.052 .223 
Startup – social 1=respondent involved in social startup, zero otherwise .032 .175 
Source: GEM 2009 unless specified otherwise. (t-1) indicates lagged variables 
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Table 2. Individual level correlations 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Commercial Entrepreneur  
start-up 
           
2 Social Entrepreneur  
start-up 
0.040           
3 Commercial Entrepreneur young & 
established 
-0.029 0.006          
4 Social Entrepreneur young & 
established 
0.035 0.147 -0.010         
5 Female  -0.054 -0.025 -0.112 -0.019        
6 Education: secondary  0.029 0.048 -0.020 0.061 -0.036       
7 Education: post-secondary 0.004 0.023 -0.010 0.062 -0.031 0.512      
8 Age -0.084 -0.052 0.013 0.017 0.021 -0.103 -0.003     
9 Age_squared  -0.085 -0.051 -0.008 0.013 0.018 -0.106 -0.017 0.983    
10 In employment 0.072 0.026 0.272 0.066 -0.197 0.171 0.167 -0.117 -0.180   
11 Business angel 0.085 0.043 0.083 0.044 -0.058 0.028 0.035 -0.030 -0.032 0.055  
12 Know entrepreneur 0.135 0.093 0.133 0.067 -0.116 0.082 0.062 -0.201 -0.205 0.127 0.159 
 
Note: Tables 2 and 3 are based only on observations actually used in estimations (i.e. excluding the joint effect of missingness). 
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Table 3: Correlations in nation level variables  
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 National prevalence rate:  
Social entrepreneurial start-up  
                  
2 National prevalence rate:  
Commercial entrepreneurial start-
up  
0,573                 
3 National prevalence rate: Young 
and established social 
Entrepreneurs 
0,302 0,074               
4 National prevalence rate: Young 
and established Commercial 
Entrepreneurs  
-0,034 0,532 0,023             
5 Government spending (t-1) -0,152 -0,570 0,315 -0,463           
6 Constraints on the Executive  
(t-1) 
-0,283 -0,425 0,208 -0,369 0,479         
7 Trust -0,009 -0,290 0,566 -0,117 0,326 0,039       
8 Associational membership 0,069 -0,082 0,428 -0,102 0,100 0,213 0,411     
9 GDP growth (t-1) 0,107 0,467 -0,186 0,435 -0,609 -0,502 -0,183 -0,233   
10 GDP (t-1) -0,367 -0,722 0,036 -0,569 0,585 0,610 0,459 0,336 -0,629 
 
Note: Tables 2 and 3 are based only on observations actually used in estimations (i.e. excluding the joint effect of missingness). 
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Table 4. Results of Logistic Multi-Level Bivariate Regression: Odds Ratios of individual-
level and country-level Effects on Commercial and Social Entry  
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  
DEPENDENT Commer.  Social  Commer.  Social  Commer.  Social  
  Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   
1 Social E. 
young & 
established 
1.31 *** 6.19 *** 1.31 *** 6.20 *** 1.31 *** 6.20 *** 
(1.07) 
 
(1.05) 
 
(1.07) 
 
(1.05) 
 
(1.07)  (1.05)  
2 Social  E. 
young & 
established – 
country mean 
131.4 * 20353.3 * 204.2 * 15108.3 * 195.8 * 11968.1 * 
(11.91) 
 
(63.62) 
 
(11.54) 
 
(52.98) 
 
(11.19)  (47.7)  
3 Commercial 
E. young & 
established 
0.34 *** 0.98  0.34 *** 0.98  0.34 *** 0.98  
(1.05)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (1.05)  
4 Commercial 
E. young & 
established – 
country mean 
3.19  0.01 ** 4.37  0.01 ** 4.36  0.01 *** 
(2.69)  (5.45)  (2.51)  (4.66)  (2.45)  (4.21)  
5 Female 0.72 *** 0.90 ** 0.72 *** 0.90 ** 0.72 *** 0.90 ** 
 (1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
6 Female – 
country mean 
4.08  2.63          
(4.64)  (13.69)          
7 Education 
secondary or 
higher 
1.25 *** 1.34 *** 1.24 *** 1.34 *** 1.24 *** 1.34 *** 
(1.04)  (1.05)  (1.04)  (1.05)  (1.04)  (1.05)  
8 Education sec 
or higher - 
country mean 
3.41 * 18.17 ** 4.33 ** 22.58 *** 4.08 ** 19.22 *** 
(1.75)  (2.6)  (1.72)  (2.45)  (1.68)  (2.25)  
9 Education 
postsecondary 
1.07 * 1.23 *** 1.07 * 1.23 *** 1.07 * 1.23 *** 
 (1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
10 Education 
postsecondary - 
country mean 
0.38 + 0.67  0.33 * 0.60  0.39 *   
(1.75)  (2.54)  (1.73)  (2.42)  (1.53)    
11 Age 1.05 *** 1.03 *** 1.05 *** 1.03 *** 1.05 *** 1.03 *** 
 (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  
12 Age - 
country mean 
0.58 *** 0.55 * 0.61 ** 0.56 * 0.61 *** 0.56 * 
(1.17)  (1.31)  (1.16)  (1.28)  (1.16)  (1.27)  
13 Age squared 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 
 (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
14 Age squared 
- country mean 
1.01 *** 1.01 * 1.01 ** 1.01 * 1.01 ** 1.01 * 
(1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
15 In 
employment 
1.83 *** 1.05  1.83 *** 1.05  1.83 *** 1.05  
(1.04)  (1.04)  (1.04)  (1.04)  (1.04)  (1.04)  
16 In 
employment - 
country mean 
0.94  0.35          
(2.03)  (3.26)          
17 Business 
angel in last 3 
years 
1.93 *** 1.32 *** 1.93 *** 1.32 *** 1.93 *** 1.32 *** 
(1.05)  (1.07)  (1.05)  (1.07)  (1.05)  (1.07)  
Table 4 continued  
39 
 
 (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  
DEPENDENT Commer.  Social  Commer  Social  Commer  Social  
  Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   
18 Business 
angel in last 3 
y - country 
mean 
0.01 + 1.53  0.02 + 1.76  0.01 *   
(13.40)  (85.80)  (11.26)  (56.77)  (6.50)    
19 Know 
entrepreneur 
2.31 **
* 
2.02 **
* 
2.31 **
* 
2.03 **
* 
2.31 *** 2.02 **
* 
(1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
20 Know 
entrepreneur – 
country mean 
3.31  3.09          
(2.58)  (5.01)          
21 Effective 
constraints on 
executive (t-1) 
1.14 * 1.14  1.17 ** 1.16 + 1.17 *** 1.17 * 
(1.05)  (1.09)  (1.05)  (1.08)  (1.05)  (1.08)  
22 
Government 
spending / 
GDP 
0.97 **
* 
0.99  0.97 **
* 
0.98 + 0.97 *** 0.98 + 
(1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  
23 Log of 
GDP per 
capita ppp (t-
1) 
0.67 * 0.48 * 0.63 ** 0.43 **
* 
0.61 *** 0.40 **
* 
(1.19)  (1.33)  (1.16)  (1.27)  (1.15)  (1.24)  
24 GDP 
growth (t-1)  
0.97  0.98  0.97  0.98  0.97  0.98  
 (1.02)  (1.04)  (1.02)  (1.04)  (1.02)  (1.04)  
Constant 25084.4 ** 722158.6 * 46630.0 ** 2676445.
1 
** 55826.3 *** 3722849.
8 
** 
 (33.58)  (386.45)  (27.99)  (246.90)  (25.30)  (164.68)  
Variance 
(cons) 
0.12 **
* 
0.361 **
* 
0.125 **
* 
0.352 **
* 
0.125 *** 0.355 **
* 
 (0.0275)  (0.0793)  (0.0286)  (0.0776)  (0.0284)  (0.0782)  
Cov 
(cons1\cons2) 
0.144 **
* 
0.0193 **
* 
0.145 **
* 
0.0203 **
* 
0.145 *** 0.0203 **
* 
(0.0392)  (0.00296
) 
 (0.0396)  (0.00296)  (0.0395)  (0.00296
) 
 
Observations 114,341  114,341  114,341  114,341  114,341  114,341  
No of 
countries 
47  47  47  47  47  47  
Standard errors in parentheses           
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10 
Both coefficients and standard errors transformed to odds ratios.       
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Table 5. Results of Logistic Multi-Level Bivariate Regression: Odds Ratios of individual-
level and country-level Effects on Commercial and Social Entry – Robustness Check with 
established Social Capital indicators  
 
 (4a)  (4b)  (5a)  (5b)  
DEPENDENT Commer.  Social  Commer.  Social  
  Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   
1 Social E. young & 
established  
1.46 *** 6.35 *** 1.47 *** 6.39 *** 
(1.07)  (1.06)  (1.07)  (1.06)  
2 Social  E. young & 
established – country 
mean 
50.3  16432.2 * 96.0 + 26108.1  
(20.49)  (75.64)  (12.95)  (31.34)  
3 Commercial E. 
young & established 
0.34 *** 1.01  0.33 *** 1.01 ** 
(1.05)  (1.05)  (1.05)  (1.05)  
4 Commercial E. 
young & established – 
country mean 
10.88 * 0.04 * 13.40 * 0.03 * 
(2.83)  (4.45)  (2.93)  (4.37)  
5 Female 0.73 *** 0.90 ** 0.73 *** 0.90 ** 
 (1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
6 Education secondary 
or higher  
1.23 *** 1.32 *** 1.22 *** 1.32 *** 
(1.04)  (1.06)  (1.04)  (1.06)  
7 Education sec or 
higher - country mean 
2.47  10.91 ** 1.70  6.02 * 
(1.75)  (2.13)  (1.82)  (2.22)  
8 Education 
postsecondary 
1.04  1.34 *** 1.04  1.35 *** 
(1.04)  (1.04)  (1.04)  (1.04)  
9 Education 
postsecondary - 
country mean 
0.72    0.68    
(1.48)    (1.54)    
10 Age 1.05 *** 1.01  1.06 *** 1.01  
 (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  
11 Age - country mean 0.57 ** 0.80  0.49 *** 0.65 + 
(1.20)  (1.30)  (1.21)  (1.30)  
12 Age squared 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 1.00 *** 1.00 ** 
 (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
13 Age squared - 
country mean 
1.01 ** 1.00  1.01 *** 1.00 + 
(1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (1.00)  
14 In employment 1.81 *** 1.07  1.80 *** 1.06  
 (1.04)  (1.05)  (1.04)  (1.05)  
15 Business angel in 
last 3 years  1.95 *** 1.39 *** 1.90 *** 1.36 *** 
 (1.05)  (1.07)  (1.05)  (1.07)  
16 Business angel in 
last 3 y - country mean 
0.02 *   0.02 *   
(5.86)    (6.69)    
17 Know entrepreneur 2.53 *** 2.09 *** 2.53 *** 2.09 *** 
(1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
 
Table 5 continued 
 (4a)  (4b)  (5a)  (5b)  
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DEPENDENT Commer.  Social  Commer.  Social  
  Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   Start-up   
18 Effective constraints 
on executive (t-1) 
1.18 ** 1.13  1.20 ** 1.16 + 
(1.06)  (1.08)  (1.06)  (1.09)  
19 Government 
spending / GDP 
0.97 *** 0.97 * 0.96 *** 0.96 ** 
(1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  (1.01)  
20 Log of GDP per 
capita ppp (t-1) 
0.80  0.45 * 0.99  0.61  
(1.26)  (1.38)  (1.29)  (1.40)  
21GDP growth (t-1) 0.99  0.96  0.98  0.94  
(1.03)  (1.04)  (1.03)  (1.04)  
22 Generalized Trust 0.997  0.995      
(1.01)  (1.01)      
23 Membership in 
associations 
    0.998 + 0.998  
    (1.00)  (1.00)  
Constant 26108.1 ** 1306.4  174555.8 ** 26108.1 * 
  (40.45)   (190.00)   (45.11)   (163.86)   
Variance (cons) 0.115 *** 0.257 *** 0.109 *** 0.218 *** 
  (0.0290)   (0.0634)   (0.0287)   (0.0563)   
Cov 
(cons1\cons2) 0.139 *** 0.0313 *** 0.120 *** 0.0297 *** 
  (0.0378)   (0.00311)   (0.0349)   (0.00318)   
Observations 103,298   103,298   98,970   98,970   
No of countries 39   39   36   36   
Standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10       
Both coefficients and standard errors transformed to odds ratios. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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Note. The dotted arrow signifies that, over time, the creation of more social enterprise start-ups (flow) at the individual level 
will lead to higher levels of entrepreneurship social capital within a country (stock).  
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